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INTRODUCTION
When the UK government was first 
confronted with the very real threat of a 
COVID-19 pandemic, policy- makers turned 
quickly, and initially almost exclusively, to 
scientific data provided by epidemiological 
models. These models have had a direct and 
significant influence on the policies and deci-
sions, such as social distancing and closure of 
schools, which aim to reduce the risk posed 
by COVID-19 to public health.1 The models 
suggested that depending on the strategies 
chosen, the number of deaths could vary by 
hundreds of thousands. From a safety engi-
neering perspective, it is clear that the data 
generated by epidemiological models are 
safety critical, and that, therefore, the models 
themselves should be regarded as safety- 
critical systems.
With safety- critical systems, we typically asso-
ciate large installations such as nuclear power 
plants and oil refineries, but also software that 
is used in cockpit flight management systems, 
as well as medical devices, such as ventilators. 
Common to these systems is the requirement 
that they have robust and rigorous assurance 
so that we can justifiably place trust in their 
operation. If we accept that epidemiological 
models fall into this category of safety- critical 
systems, that is, that failures in their design, 
operation and use can kill people, then 
we should expect that they hold up to this 
requirement of assured performance.
However, there are significant gaps in the 
understanding of COVID-19 and this intro-
duces uncertainty into epidemiological 
models, such as whether individuals who have 
recovered have enduring protective immu-
nity, and what the extent of asymptomatic 
infection is.2 In addition, mitigation strate-
gies such as contact tracing rely on people’s 
behaviour (eg, whether or not people down-
load and use a contact tracing app), which 
can be hard to predict and model reliably.3 
Epidemiological models that are executed as 
simulations on computers can also require 
fairly complex software code, and this needs 
to be dependable—but from experience, we 
know that this cannot be taken for granted.4 
It is, therefore, vital that decision makers 
are made aware of the quality of the models 
and the assumptions underlying them and 
that they can reflect on the limitations of 
the models in relation to practical decisions 
about the management of the pandemic.
Again, looking across at safety- critical 
systems, it is best practice and frequently an 
explicit regulatory requirement to produce 
a safety or assurance case—a structured, 
explicit argument supported by evidence.5 6 
Assurance cases are a primary means by which 
confidence in the safety of the system is 
communicated to and scrutinised by the 
diverse stakeholders, including regulators 
and policy- makers.
In this commentary, we put forward the 
suggestion that developers of epidemiolog-
ical models consider complementing their 
models with an assurance case that explains 
to users how, and to what extent, the resulting 
evidence can support and substantiate policy 
decisions. We argue that such an assurance 
case has the potential to enable a wider 
understanding, and a critical review, of the 
expected benefits, limitations and assump-
tions that underpin the development of the 
epidemiological models and the extent to 
which these issues, including the different 
sources of uncertainty, are considered in the 
policy decision- making process.
ASSURANCE CASES IN UK SAFETY-CRITICAL 
SYSTEMS
An assurance case may consider different 
critical dependability properties of a system, 
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such as safety, security, availability and maintainability. 
With respect to safety, an assurance case is primarily used 
to communicate and critically evaluate a safety argument 
about risk- based decisions to commission a system or a 
service. Put simply, an assurance case helps us determine 
whether we can be confident that a system is safe for use. 
We expect the developers and operators of systems to 
convince us through the argument that they have consid-
ered all relevant risks and that they have dealt with them 
satisfactorily. We want to be shown the evidence for that 
and we want to know about any gaps in the argument or 
the evidence. Data from modelling, simulation, testing 
and in- service usage provide the evidence base for claims 
about safety. However, this evidence is rarely conclusive. 
It entails different sources of uncertainty and hinges on 
technical, organisational and social assumptions. The 
argument should make these issues and the way in which 
they relate to each other explicitly to enable the different 
stakeholders to critically review, modify, accept or reject 
the claims.
The use of assurance cases is a long- established prac-
tice in the engineering domain of safety- critical systems. 
Particularly in the UK, the development of an assurance 
case is a mandatory requirement in key sectors such as 
defence, nuclear and rail.7 More pertinently, in the 
National Health Service (NHS), compliance with the NHS 
Digital clinical safety standards DCB0129 and DCB0160 
requires an assurance case for Health IT systems.8 Exam-
ples of assurance cases submitted to NHS Digital include 
adult and children’s social care case management appli-
cations, as well as prominent and well- known systems 
such as Babylon Health’s GP at Hand suite of applications 
(which includes the AI- based symptom checker).
Although, thus, medical devices (through EU regu-
lations) and, to a certain extent, Health IT systems are 
regulated and have to follow in their development estab-
lished risk- management and assurance standards, this 
does not yet seem to apply to epidemiological models. 
As epidemiological models are intended to inform deci-
sion making at the policy level, although safety- critical, 
they fall outside the scope of regulation and assurance 
standards, because they are not used in the provision of 
clinical services.
ASSURANCE CASES FOR EVIDENCE-BASED COVID-19 POLICY
As a highly salient example, we consider Report 9 by the 
Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (‘the impact 
of non- pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) on the reduc-
tion of COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand’).9 
This is an example of epidemiological modelling based 
on microsimulation to provide primary evidence that 
can have significant policy implications. We can view the 
structure of a COVID-19 policy assurance case as an inte-
gration of the following, as illustrated in figure 1:
A. Scientific evidence, such as data from epidemiologi-
cal modelling (in this case: microsimulation).
B. Scientific conclusion, often referred to as ‘scientific 
advice’, concerning the effect of the different public 
health strategies based on the scientific evidence.
C. Policy decisions concerning the chosen public health 
strategy based on the scientific conclusion, but also 
considering national values, policy goals and so on.
Distinguishing between scientific conclusions and 
policy decisions is important because policy decisions 
about how to manage the risk of COVID-19 are risk- 
informed rather than risk- based.10 This means that policy 
decisions involve broader considerations than just scien-
tific conclusions about risk—examples include ethical, 
economic and societal concerns and tradeoffs (eg, the 
debate about reopening of schools). This perspective also 
helps explain why—given the same scientific evidence and 
conclusions—different countries might rationally and 
justifiably adopt different policies to manage COVID-19 
risk.10
Figure 1 Overall assurance case structure for a COVID-19 
policy.
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It is important that the relationship of these struc-
tural elements of the assurance case (scientific evidence, 
scientific conclusions and policy decisions) is explained 
through well- reasoned and sound arguments:
D. Scientific argument explaining the extent to which 
the scientific evidence (A) supports the scientific con-
clusions (B).
E. Policy argument explaining the extent to which the 
scientific conclusions (B) are sufficient to support the 
policy decisions (C).
F. Confidence argument explaining the trustworthiness of 
the scientific evidence (A), for example, the trustwor-
thiness of the epidemiological model.
Scientific evidence
An important part of the scientific evidence comes from 
epidemiological models, even though there will be other 
sources of scientific evidence, such as literature reviews. 
Epidemiological models are engineering artefacts. For 
use in safety- critical decision making, they should be 
systematically specified, implemented and tested. The 
rigour with which this is performed should be propor-
tionate to the criticality of these models to the decision- 
making process. Given the prominence and importance 
of epidemiological models in determining a response to 
COVID-19, the criticality of the models is extremely high.
The COVID-19 model used by the Imperial team is 
based on a modified individual- based simulation that 
was developed to support pandemic influenza planning. 
Models can be intended for a specific purpose, and there-
fore, a confidence argument would need to justify the 
suitability of the model for the new context, including 
the continued validity of the original parameters. This 
is important because ad- hoc reuse and modification of 
designs have been associated repeatedly with catastrophic 
accidents in other safety- critical domains (eg, the recent 
Boeing 737 Max accidents11).
The quality of the software design and the code of the 
simulator is an important factor, particularly its amena-
bility to inspection and testing.4 For instance, Neil 
Ferguson, the lead author of the Imperial report, stated 
the following: ‘For me the code is not a mess, but it’s all in 
my head, completely undocumented. Nobody would be able to 
use it… and I don’t have the bandwidth to support individual 
users’.12 In a safety- critical context, this would significantly 
undermine confidence in the simulation results. It is actu-
ally common practice in high- risk software engineering 
to employ different software teams to produce different 
versions of the same software programme to guard 
against mistakes. That indicates how important—and 
how difficult—it is to get the software design and coding 
done without errors.
The validity of the simulation results hinges on 
large uncertainties and many societal assumptions, for 
example, about population behavioural changes. In large 
part, this is because COVID-19 is a novel virus, which is 
still relatively poorly understood.2 The developers of the 
model made many of their assumptions explicit by listing 
the corresponding parameters and where data exist to 
support the chosen parameter values. This is useful and 
enables an independent assessment and evolution of the 
model. However, decision makers also need to know how 
confident they can be that these parameters and assump-
tions are adequate. For example, the report states an 
assumption that 30% of patients with COVID-19 who are 
hospitalised will require critical care (invasive mechan-
ical ventilation) based on early reports from cases in the 
UK, China and Italy. We now know that this was a signif-
icant overestimate due to a combination of miscommu-
nication (‘critical care’ in many other countries includes 
non- invasive measures such as continuous positive airway 
pressure devices) and the effects of the initial official UK 
advice to ‘intubate early’.
Scientific conclusion and argument
Given the novelty of COVID-19 and the large uncertain-
ties around the design of the model and its underpin-
ning data, the transition from the scientific evidence to 
the overall scientific conclusion is not straightforward.13 
There are usually multiple sources of evidence, neither 
of which fully supports a conclusion by itself, and each of 
which has associated uncertainty. It is important, then, to 
explain through an argument why the evidence provides 
sufficient support to the conclusions and how confident 
we can be.
Figure 2 illustrates how the scientific argument can be 
captured and represented in a structured way through 
identifying the claims that are made, the evidence that 
supports those claims and the relationships between 
them.
In figure 2, only a very simplified structured argument 
is shown as an example (adapted based on9). The results 
of modelling for different NPIs are used as evidence to 
support claims about the impact these interventions will 
have on the number of deaths. This is accompanied by 
evidence about the suitability for repurposing the model 
for COVID-19, evidence coming from independent 
inspection of the software code and evidence about the 
reliability of the model outputs. Such evidence is used to 
support an epidemiological claim that a specific combina-
tion of NPIs will result in a certain number of deaths with 
reasonable confidence.
The full argument would be much more comprehen-
sive and draw on further evidence. For example, while we 
have referred to practices for increasing confidence from 
the high- risk software engineering domain, these could 
be complemented with reference to existing best prac-
tices for simulation model building and validation.14 15 
The assurance case provides a structure for representing 
the diverse evidence but does not prescribe what evidence 
is provided. This is for the developers and assessors of the 
assurance case to reflect on.
To represent the scientific argument in a structured 
way, we have used a graphical notation, the Goal Struc-
turing Notation,16 which is widely used in safety- critical 
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domains for creating and communicating structured 
assurance arguments.
Policy decisions and argument
Moving from scientific advice and evidence to a policy 
decision requires that policy- makers consider assump-
tions, risk acceptance beliefs and tradeoffs (such as 
between economic and medical impact) that are not often 
direct and amenable to rigorous scientific examination.13 
The transition from scientific conclusions to a policy 
decision should therefore involve a complex and diverse 
policy argument that builds on the scientific conclusions, 
but also brings to bear these additional considerations.17 
Imperial College Report 9 contains some explicit sugges-
tions for policy (decisions), but it does not contain a 
policy argument.9
A good policy argument should justify the reliance on 
particular sources of scientific advice and models and 
acknowledge the extent to which the underlying sources 
of uncertainty in the evidence were considered. The policy 
argument should make clear how tradeoffs were made 
and how evidence concerning the economic, legal and 
ethical implications of the chosen policy was generated 
and appraised. In the COVID-19 context, such evidence 
should also incorporate estimation of non- COVID-19 
health harms, for example, potential delays in cancer 
diagnosis and treatment.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our society is currently placing great weight on epide-
miological models of COVID-19 effects. Although such 
models are essential for dealing with the pandemic, it 
is hard to know which models we should trust, to what 
extent and under what conditions. Therefore, we need 
to make an interdisciplinary effort to create transparency 
around these models.
The use of assurance cases can help with creating such 
transparency. Scientists developing and using epide-
miological models can document systematically in the 
assurance case the assumptions they have made, the 
confidence they have in their respective assumptions and 
the steps they have taken to ensure that the outputs of 
their models are valid. This is not dissimilar in nature to 
the limitations section of a research paper. However, for 
epidemiological models it would also include additional 
considerations such as what steps have been taken to 
ensure that the code that executes the models is correct. 
Making these assumptions, safeguards and remaining 
uncertainties explicit increases transparency and can help 
Figure 2 An example of part of a structured scientific argument for COVID-19 simulation. ICU, intensive care unit.
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policy- makers place justified confidence in the scientific 
conclusions. This principle also applies to the policy level. 
Transparency in policy decisions, along with a description 
of the assumptions and uncertainties allows for public 
scrutiny of decisions taken.
In such an effort, epidemiologists and health data 
scientists will have a central role, but they will need 
support from software engineers, including those with 
safety- critical software experience. Working together, 
such collaborations will be able to create standards for 
developing, testing and maintaining these models in a 
consistent, rigorous and auditable manner. They will 
be able to build assurance cases that communicate the 
uncertainty, assumptions and tradeoffs to a wide variety of 
stakeholders. This knowledge will then aid policy- makers 
in using pandemic models in exactly the ways that they 
are useful and not in the ways that they are not.
Is it realistic to expect these changes to happen? It 
might be cynical to reason about the level of transpar-
ency at the policy level, but as far as the scientific level 
is concerned, we can be more optimistic. The computer 
code for some epidemiological models has been made 
available for scrutiny and we have seen similar efforts for 
transparency with regards to the code for the (now aban-
doned) NHSX contact tracing app, which was subjected 
to independent security analysis. Even so, there is still a 
need to raise awareness about the contributions disci-
plines such as safety engineering can make and the onus 
is as much on engineering bodies to demonstrate the 
benefits their techniques can bring, as it is on healthcare 
regulators to require the application of such techniques 
through regulations.
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